Taiwan's military fire artillery from M109 self-propelled Howitzers during the annual Han Kuang exercises (AP)

While the Republican and Democratic parties plunge into painful realignments, China is making its own moves internationally. Taiwan has become a major flashpoint of the U.S.-China rivalry, and two books on the topic reveal not only some of the key arguments taking place in the United States about Taiwan, but also why this realignment is happening.

In recent decades, much of the professoriate has lowered its sights from the serious study of big issues to gaze fixedly at navels. This, as much as China’s generous treatment of its friends, explains how much of the credentialed class missed the implications of a rising, hostile Communist superpower. Tufts University’s Sulmaan Wasif Khan is still grappling with the big issues though, and he tries to get to the heart of the Taiwan problem in his newest book. The Struggle for Taiwan is well written and forcefully argued, but it contains many of the flaws that plague his profession.

As Khan sees it, "confusion has played the starring role" in the unfolding saga of China, Taiwan, and the United States. "Luck, more than deterrence, prevented a conflict" in past confrontations between China and the United States in the Strait, so deterrence is a thin reed on which to rest a country’s existence. As he sees it, getting back to a good relationship with China, or, failing that, a neutral one, is vital for the United States’ well-being.

He is right that the Taiwan question is perplexing, since it has given Americans fits for decades. In 1949, George Kennan thought he had discovered the perfect way to cut the Gordian knot: Invade Taiwan, forcibly displace Chiang Kai Shek and his 300,000 troops, then make Taiwan independent. Kennan submitted a memo about it and, after briefly reconsidering the matter, withdrew it the same day. Curiously, Khan describes this madcap scheme as "a profound reading of the situation." He is correct that "if Washington was serious about independence, this was precisely the form of policy that was required," which is why no one in Washington contemplated it for long. There was no appetite for anything as self-defeating as a "Theodore Roosevelt-style assault" on Taiwan.

As Khan tells it, Chiang was an untrustworthy ally who maintained his grip on power through the connivance of the "China lobby," which was largely motivated by McCarthyism and greed for Chiang’s lavish gifts. Mao, however, "wanted a rapprochement with the United States," which he demonstrated when he "carefully calibrated" his repeated shelling of Taiwanese-held islands and sparking crises with the United States. After Nixon visited China, Taiwan was an irritant in the Sino-American relationship, its democratization almost as much of a headache as the old dictatorship.

Readers who are familiar with the long sweep of U.S. foreign policy may scratch their heads at this book. Chiang was often prickly, but he was not nearly as difficult as other allies like Charles de Gaulle, so it can be hard to see what all the fuss is about. Khan later depicts a recent controversy in Taiwan about importing American pork as an example of the United States running roughshod over other countries. But nearly every country on earth is asked to take American farm products: Just ask the French about American chickens. Khan suggests Nancy Pelosi’s 2022 visit to Taiwan with her son in tow made the Taiwanese wonder if the price of support was greasing American palms. But considering his sources are a Chinese propaganda website and a story about congressional Republicans criticizing Pelosi fils’s China ties, it is not clear if any Taiwanese agree with him.

Khan’s analysis of the forces driving the confrontation over Taiwan leaves him trapped in an intellectual cul-de-sac. For example, he argues that if the United States had responded more forcefully to Chinese provocations in 1958 and 1995-1996, and if China then raised the ante in a destructive way, a war might have broken out, so deterrence is unreliable. Conversely, he says, "U.S.-China relations have worked best when the two sides have maintained a commitment to keep talking to one another." But China cuts off communications during perilous moments to increase the pressure on Washington, so his statement amounts to "when there are no problems, the relationship is better." And since his counterfactuals did not actually happen, they are not evidence of deterrence failure.

His way out? Perhaps China could simply allow Taiwan to declare independence, or the United States could offer enough incentives that China would agree to renounce the use of force for a time. China has never agreed to that though, so Khan’s fallback is to threaten sanctions but eschew military force. This did not deter Vladimir Putin from invading Ukraine though, so his plan seems guaranteed to start a war.

As the university has lost its moorings, think tanks have filled the gap to provide government officials with serious outside analysis and recommendations. Matt Pottinger, a deputy national security adviser for Donald Trump and one of the Republican Party’s top China hands, assembled a team that includes many of his Hoover Institution colleagues to study the Taiwan problem. In their book The Boiling Moat, Pottinger, et al, argue that the China problem is a difficult one, but that the United States can maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The key is deterrence.

Pottinger and his coauthors point out that the Taiwan issue has grown more perilous not only because of China’s massive military buildup, but also because Xi Jinping has indicated that he is willing to use this military. Unlike his predecessors, Xi has warned American officials that he might invade Taiwan even if the island democracy does not declare independence, and he has told the Chinese Communist Party and its military to prepare for war. As Pottinger, et al, see it, keeping Taiwan free will be difficult, but not impossible. They offer "practical and feasible steps that democracies should pursue urgently to deter Xi from triggering a catastrophic war over Taiwan."

A Chinese invasion is the most spectacular threat to Taiwan’s independence, even though it is arguably not the most probable, and the authors show how to defend against it. They prefer "deterrence by denial—getting the adversary to understand that its military strategies have little chance of success, thus discouraging it from aggression." The Chinese military’s center of gravity would be the naval forces needed to ferry the Chinese army onto Taiwan, so the authors describe how Taiwanese defenders can bloody the invaders while American satellites and surveillance tools identify targets for prowling submarines and bombers to swoop in. The United States is not making enough of these bombers, submarines, and weapons to pull this off, but increasing production rates by 50 percent would only cost about $7.5 billion. Unlike other advocates of "deterrence by denial" for Taiwan, the Hoover team sees no reason to cut off arms to Ukraine, which needs very few of the kinds of weapons useful in a Pacific war.

Because an invasion would be daunting, China might prefer other options, such as blockades and propaganda campaigns, and The Boiling Moat contributors look at how to thwart those plans too. Many of these can be defeated through relatively simple methods, such as stockpiling enough food and fuel to outlast a blockade. Nearly all of them involve United States, Taiwanese, and other friendly militaries collaborating much more closely, both during the planning stage and if war breaks out.

Khan suggests the current tensions with China are largely due to red-baiting Americans, but the international team Pottinger assembled belies that claim. Australian, Danish, Israeli, Japanese, and Taiwanese former officials and policy experts contribute short, brisk chapters about how to convince China to give peace a chance.

The Boiling Moat is full of sensible ideas to reduce the risk of defeat, and therefore of war, but the major question is how receptive policymakers are to it. Donald Trump said in a recent interview, "You know, we’re no different than an insurance company. Taiwan doesn’t give us anything." Joe Biden has said repeatedly he would defend Taiwan, but his conduct toward Ukraine does not inspire confidence.

Like many policy books, The Boiling Moat is not meant to be a beach read. The prose is generally quite good, but much of the book covers missile production rates and force planning requirements that will appeal more to practitioners than the public. But as American politics takes a more populist turn, Pottinger and his fellow authors are showing the credentialed class how to revitalize their professions. They are soberly assessing some of the biggest issues facing the country and developing options to keep the American people, their friends, and their allies free. Peace-loving Americans should send copies to their representatives in Congress.

The Boiling Moat: Urgent Steps to Defend Taiwan
Edited by Matt Pottinger
Hoover Institution Press, 269 pp., $25.95

The Struggle for Taiwan: A History of America, China, and the Island Caught Between
by Sulmaan Wasif Khan
Basic Books, 336 pp., $32

Source link