The India-Pakistan conflict, a perennial fault line in South Asian geopolitics, has by now taken on new dimensions, evolving into a complex Eurasian issue with alleged involvement of actors as diverse as the Taliban and Israel.

The recent escalations, marked by India’s Operation Sindoor in response to the Pahalgam terror attack, and Pakistan’s retaliatory Operation Bunyan Marsoos, underscore the fragility of the region’s security architecture.

While a supposedly US-mediated ceasefire, announced with characteristic bravado by President Donald Trump, has temporarily halted hostilities, its durability remains questionable. One may recall that third-party mediation, particularly on the contentious issue of Jammu and Kashmir, has long been a taboo for India, which insists on bilateral resolutions.

Yet, the involvement of extra-regional players and the shifting allegiances of the Taliban necessitate a broader multilateral approach. Herein lies the potential—albeit fraught with challenges—for the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and BRICS to serve as platforms for dialogue, or even conflict resolution.

The complexity of the current crisis stems from its entanglement with actors beyond the subcontinent. Reports suggest that the Taliban, historically a Pakistani ally, is increasingly aligning with India, a development that has raised eyebrows in Islamabad.

This shift was evident when India’s External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar engaged with Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister, who condemned the Pahalgam attack, marking a rare political-level contact since the Taliban’s 2021 takeover. There are nuances: the Taliban’s Kandahar faction, reportedly fostering ties with the Indian authorities in New Delhi, contrasts with the Haqqani Network’s deep connections to Islamabad, which thus highlights internal divisions that complicate the group’s role.

On top of that, allegations of Israeli support for India, including the provision of drones integral to New Delhi’s military strategy, further internationalize the conflict, drawing parallels with Israel’s own territorial disputes. Thus, the India-Pakistan conflict is no longer a purely bilateral affair by any shot but rather a Eurasian flashpoint with global implications.

Trump’s claim of brokering the ceasefire has stirred controversy, particularly in India, where it is seen as an overreach that undermines national sovereignty. Pakistani officials, conversely, have welcomed external mediation, with their envoy in Beijing explicitly endorsing Trump’s offer to mediate on Kashmir. So much for bilateralism, as Pakistan’s openness to international involvement contrasts sharply with New Delhi’s rejection of third-party roles.

The alleged American intervention, while temporarily effective, lacks the institutional backing to ensure lasting peace, and its unilateral announcement by Trump before official statements from India or Pakistan has fueled political backlash in New Delhi. This underscores the need for a more structured, multilateral framework to address the conflict’s root causes, particularly the Kashmir dispute. To put it bluntly, the West’s disarray, evident in Trump’s erratic ceasefire claims, underscores its diminishing coherence in navigating global conflicts like India-Pakistan.

This is where the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS could play a pivotal role, despite their limitations. The SCO, comprising India, Pakistan, China, Russia, and Central Asian states, offers a unique platform where both adversaries are members. However, its lack of a formal conflict-resolution mechanism and New Delhi’s historical reluctance to internationalize the Kashmir issue pose significant hurdles.

As I noted back in 2021, the SCO’s potential as a mediator in conflicts is hamstrung by its focus on security cooperation rather than political dispute resolution.

Yet, the organization’s emphasis on regional stability and counterterrorism could provide a neutral space for dialogue, especially given the Taliban’s potential role as a complicating factor. India has been arguing for frameworks such as the Quad to get involved in Afghanistan—why not the SCO? As I wrote before, India’s participation in both the West-led Quad and the SCO is the very embodiment of New Delhi’s role as a “balancing power”.

Be it as it may, the SCO’s 2025 agenda, which includes discussions on Afghanistan’s stabilization, could be leveraged to address cross-border terrorism—a key Indian grievance—while encouraging confidence-building measures between India and Pakistan.

BRICS, meanwhile, presents a complementary avenue. As I argued in 2022, BRICS’ economic focus and its inclusion of India and China—both wary of Western-dominated mediation—make it a potential forum for soft diplomacy. Pakistan’s bid to join BRICS, though currently blocked by New Delhi, underscores Islamabad’s desire to integrate into this bloc, which could incentivize cooperation. BRICS’ evolving role in fostering dialogue among members with divergent interests suggests after all that economic incentives could pave the way for political détente. For instance, joint BRICS initiatives on infrastructure or counterterrorism could indirectly reduce tensions by fostering interdependence, thereby creating stakes for peace.

The main challenge of course remains India’s steadfast opposition to third-party mediation, rooted in its belief that external involvement dilutes its sovereignty over Kashmir. This stance is compounded by the SCO’s and BRICS’ internal dynamics, where China’s support for Pakistan and Russia’s balancing act between New Delhi and Islamabad limit consensus. Moreover, the Taliban’s fragmented structure and alleged proxy roles for both India and Pakistan undermine trust. Yet, these challenges are not insurmountable. The SCO could initiate track-two diplomacy, involving non-governmental actors to build trust, while BRICS could prioritize economic cooperation to create mutual interests. Both platforms, by virtue of their multilateral nature, offer a less intrusive alternative to Western-led mediation, which India understandably distrusts.

The aforementioned involvement of extra-regional actors like the Taliban and Israel calls for a broader approach to the India-Pakistan conflict. One may recall that unilateral or bilateral efforts, such as the 1999 Lahore Declaration, often falter due to mistrust or external spoilers. The SCO and BRICS, again, despite their limitations, do provide platforms where India and Pakistan can engage under the guise of regional cooperation, sidestepping the sensitivities of direct mediation. For instance, SCO-led counterterrorism exercises could address India’s concerns about Pakistan-based militias, while BRICS’ economic forums could incentivize Islamabad to curb such activities in exchange for trade benefits. These steps, while incremental, could build the trust necessary for substantive dialogue.

In conclusion, the India-Pakistan conflict’s evolution into a fully Eurasian issue, with alleged Taliban and Israeli involvement, underscores the need for innovative approaches to peace. Trump’s ceasefire, while a temporary reprieve, highlights the pitfalls of ad hoc mediation. The SCO and BRICS, though not designed for conflict resolution, offer unique opportunities for dialogue due to their regional focus and inclusion of key stakeholders. By leveraging their platforms for confidence-building and economic cooperation, these organizations could pave the way for a more stable South Asia, provided India can be persuaded to embrace multilateralism. In a way, it should serve as a proving ground for multilateralism and alternative mechanisms in the emerging polycentric world.

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This article was originally published on InfoBrics.

Uriel Araujo, PhD, is an anthropology researcher with a focus on international and ethnic conflicts. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

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