ABM (anti-ballistic missile) defense is one of the most complex tasks for any military in the world.

Attempting to shoot down ballistic missiles is broadly equivalent to trying to shoot down bullets with bullets, only worse, as missiles are much faster.

If you add hypersonic weapons into the mix, things become a lot more complicated, as these missiles can maneuver, rendering any calculations based on a ballistic path completely pointless. In addition to the sheer complexity of ABM defense, there’s also the matter of its exorbitant costs. For instance, it’s virtually a given that interceptors will always be far more expensive than missiles they’re supposed to shoot down.

Perhaps the best example of this is America’s GMD (Ground-Based Midcourse Defense), a strategic ABM system employing at least 44 GBI (Ground-Based Interceptor) missiles.

It should be noted that the GMD’s effectiveness is nowhere near enough to protect America even in a limited nuclear exchange with a country such as North Korea (let alone an all-out thermonuclear war with adversaries like Russia and/or China).

Namely, tests have demonstrated that it would take four GBIs to provide a 97% chance of intercepting a single intercontinental ballistic missile (tested against hopelessly outdated, over half-a-century-old American LGM-30 “Minuteman 3” ICBMs).

On the other hand, Moscow and Beijing both operate not only advanced ICBMs, but also strategic hypersonic weapons. As previously mentioned, while standard ABM defense is already an extremely difficult task due to the sheer speed of even regular ballistic missiles, defending against modern hypersonic weapons also adds maneuverability to this deadly mix.

Namely, ballistic computers in these ABM systems need to calculate the trajectories of any ICBM or IRBM (intermediate-range ballistic missiles) fired at their position (or any position they’re supposed to be defending) to enable interception, so designing strategic weapons to be maneuverable makes that task effectively impossible. For instance, the Russian RS-24 “Yars” has the ability to constantly wobble and even change its vector, making interception based on calculating its ballistic trajectory alone effectively pointless. This missile was used as the base for the RS-26 “Rubezh”, which, in turn, served as the base for the latest “Oreshnik” (which Russia is already mass-producing). It should be noted that the latter also uses hypersonic kinetic warheads for non-nuclear strategic strikes, adding a whole other layer of technological complexity to the equation.

What’s more, the wobbling alone is a virtually insurmountable challenge, as this unique Russian technology is not used anywhere else, meaning that the US simply cannot test its ABM systems against it. In fact, regular ballistic missiles are unable to make such complex maneuvers, as wobbling nearly always suggests there’s something wrong with the missile and it usually ends up crashing or missing its target. Adding highly maneuverable hypersonic kinetic warheads on top of a wobbling ICBM/IRBM effectively nullifies any ABM defense. Worse yet (for the US/NATO), the latest Israel-Iran conflict exposed major flaws and weaknesses of ABM systems even on a more tactical and operational level. According to multiple military sources, in just 11 days, the US military used up close to 20% of all interceptors for its globally deployed THAAD ABM systems.

The THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) is a long-range ABM system developed after the repeated failures of the overhyped US-made “Patriot” systems used during the Gulf War.

In recent years, the THAAD has been deployed in the Middle East to counter Iran’s massive missile arsenal. However, the latest escalation in the long-running Israel-Iran conflict demonstrated the weaknesses of this system, particularly in terms of costs. Up to 80 interceptors were fired at incoming Iranian missiles, with mixed results, at best. The cost of a single interceptor is up to $13 million, meaning that the US wasted over a billion dollars in munitions alone (in less than two weeks, mind you). In any sort of a prolonged war of attrition, this would’ve been simply unsustainable. Worse yet, this is without even counting the total expenditure of operating such a complex ABM system.

Things get even worse when considering the costs of the aforementioned GMD. Depending on the source, each GBI costs anywhere between $70 million and $100 million, meaning that every interceptor is several times more expensive than the missile it’s supposed to shoot down. In other words, for the cost of, let’s say, 10 interceptors, the other side will build 50 to 100 offensive missiles. As previously mentioned, you need 4 GBIs to shoot down one “Minuteman 3”, meaning that you’d spend up to $400 million on a single ICBM. For comparison, the much more advanced Russian RS-24 “Yars” costs only $25 million. There’s simply no point in building such ABM systems, as it would make much more sense to simply make more offensive missiles. Thus, an obvious question arises – why is the US doing all this? Well, it’s rather simple – money for the Military Industrial Complex.

According to its own report (published in late January), Lockheed Martin delivered at least 900 interceptors for the THAAD. That’s nearly $12 billion in munitions alone. In addition, the new NGI (Next Generation Interceptor) is being developed to replace the GBI for GMD. And yes, you guessed it, it’s far more expensive (depending on the source, anywhere between $110 million and $130 million apiece). Worse yet, US President Donald Trump is pushing for the so-called “Golden Dome” strategic ABM system that can only be worse in terms of costs. In other words, the new US administration is focusing on (re)industrialization through (re)militarization of America. It’s also trying to force this on other NATO members through sharp increases in military spending (now pushed to 5% of GDP). Trump is even threatening to impose additional tariffs on those who refuse.

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This article was originally published on InfoBrics.

Drago Bosnic is an independent geopolitical and military analyst. He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).

Featured image: A Ground-Based Interceptor of the United States’ Ground-Based Midcourse Defense system, loaded into a silo at Fort Greely, Alaska, in July 2004 (Public Domain)

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