The global financial system, long dominated by Western institutions like the World Bank and the IMF, faces a quiet but persistent challenge from the New Development Bank (NDB), often referred to as the BRICS Bank. Under the leadership of former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, the NDB has positioned itself as a potential counterweight to the Western-led financial order, though analysts question its capacity to really reshape global finance. Having consistently kept its AA+ rating from S&P Global, the NDB has indeed demonstrated credibility, but expectations regarding it — such as complementing initiatives like China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), expanding membership, or promoting full-fledged de-dollarization — face significant challenges and possibilities in an emerging multipolar world. Be as it may, the bank’s trajectory indicates a bold, albeit underreported, shift in the geopolitical financial landscape.

The NDB, established in 2015 by the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), was conceived as a multilateral development bank (MDB) to finance infrastructure and sustainable development projects in emerging economies. Unlike Western institutions, which often impose stringent conditions (typically tied to economic liberalization  reforms, which some would describe as “neoliberal”), the BRICS bank instead prioritizes flexibility and local-currency lending, aiming to reduce risks for borrowers and promote the growth of capital markets in member countries as well as reducing reliance on the US dollar.

Rousseff, who has led the bank since March 2023 (she was re-elected for a five-year term in 2025), has been a vocal advocate for this shift, in terms of steering the NDB toward a multipolar financial vision  She has emphasized the bank’s role in serving the Global South, by financing projects like a 1.2-billion-yuan loan for environmental initiatives in China, which align with sustainable development goals. This focus on sustainability and infrastructure arguably positions the NDB as a complement to China’s BRI, as analyst Joseph Bouchard has pointed out, by creating a synergy that could amplify the Global South’s economic autonomy.

One may recall that the NDB’s very creation was a response to the perceived inequities of Western-dominated financial institutions. The bank’s commitment to lending 30% of its loans in local currencies by 2026 is a blunt challenge to dollar hegemony: it aims to shield member states from exchange rate volatility and American monetary policy shifts. A study supports the feasibility of this goal, suggesting that “increased intra-BRICS trade may reduce reliance on the US dollar for transactions, especially in the short term”.

This move aligns with broader BRICS efforts to explore alternative payment systems, such as the BRICS Bridge, a digital platform for cross-border transactions using central bank digital currencies (CBDCs). Russian President Vladimir Putin’s discussions with Rousseff about this platform (during the St Petersburg International Economic Forum on June 18) signal a strategic push toward a dollar-free future, a development that has been blatantly underreported in Western media. Russia’s ruble, now a top-performing currency, further emboldens this agenda, challenging the dollar’s dominance in global trade.

The NDB’s expansion of membership is another critical dimension of its potential to reshape the financial order. Countries like Iran, Uzbekistan, and Colombia have recently sought or secured membership (Algeria officially joined last month). Meanwhile, the broader BRICS group, which founded the NDB, has attracted significant attention, with over 30 countries, including seeking membership or partner status.

This growing interest reflects the NDB’s appeal as an alternative to Western financial institutions, particularly for nations facing sanctions or seeking greater economic sovereignty. Iran’s pursuit of membership, for instance, underscores the bank’s role as a financial lifeline for countries marginalized by the Washington-led system.

Yet, BRICS and NDB expansion faces challenges, as integrating new members without diluting the influence of founding states (like Brazil and India) requires balance, as both have expressed caution about rapid expansion  —  while China in contrast has pushed for it. Brazil’s 2025 BRICS leadership enhances the NDB’s role amid US-China tensions, aligning with Beijing’s BRI-related investments in Latin America. However, India’s concerns, geopolitical volatility, and sanctions arguably limit the NDB’s ability to finance projects ($39 billion across 120 initiatives by 2025). Moreover, financial risks demand prudent governance to maintain the NDB’s AA+ rating and stability. These challenges are real enough. In any case, the NDB has thus far proven its viability.

But the point is that the NDB, currently under Rousseff’s leadership, is not merely a complement to Beijing’s BRI but rather is a potential catalyst for a broader reorientation of global finance. It goes even beyond that: I’ve commented before on how the dollar, a fiat currency issued by the US, extends American sovereignty worldwide, backed as it is by no tangible asset. It is often weaponized as the “dollar bomb” and has been part of a kind of an American de facto right of seigniorage over the global economy — without the limitations of any issuance rules. More recently, it has also weaponized the dollar-based SWIFT system. This has served well American hegemony aspirations and should be understood within the framework of a wider project with economic, political, military and even cultural dimensions.

The NDB directly threatens all of that and thus challenges the dollar-centric financial system. Such a challenge bears huge geopolitical implications and will not be left unanswered. For example, while BRICS countries have called for reforms in the IMF’s Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), Washington has repeatedly blocked proposals for changes in IMF quota systems or the expansion of SDR baskets to include the yuan or other BRICS currencies, so as to effectively preserve dollar dominance. Trump’s threats of 100% Tariffs on BRICS countries and the still unimplemented “Mar-a-Lago Accord” are part of this larger context, and one should expect such pressures to escalate.

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This article was originally published on InfoBrics.

Uriel Araujo, PhD, is an anthropology researcher with a focus on international and ethnic conflicts. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

Featured image is from Bb3015 / Wikipedia

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