Russian President Vladmir Putin and his Turkish counterpart Tayyip Erdogan talked over the telephone recently and discussed resuming the Black Sea Grain Initiative (BSGI). This agreement, originally brokered in 2022 by Turkey and the UN, had previously enabled the safe export of nearly 33 million metric tons of Ukrainian grain despite the ongoing conflict, until Russia withdrew in 2023, citing obstacles to its own food and fertilizer exports.

During the call, Erdogan emphasized that ensuring safe shipping routes could support peace efforts with Ukraine, and Turkey offered to contribute to such efforts. 

The discussion also touched on broader cooperation, including in Syria, aiming to reduce sectarian violence and achieve stability. Turkish-Russian Bilateral relations are overall good, one could say, but there is plenty of room for tensions, despite Turkey’s mediation efforts and balancing acts. While Moscow fights in Ukraine, Ankara is in fact making waves in the Black Sea itself, and Erdogan’s subtle power grab could in fact spark a new conflict—or at least force Moscow to blink.

In fact, Ankara has been expanding its naval presence and influence over shipping routes, thereby potentially clashing with Moscow’s interests, by straddling a tense line in the Black Sea, while balancing NATO commitments with its own ambitions. One may recall that, starting in 2022, Turkey, invoking the 1936 Montreux Convention, restricted Russia’s ability to reinforce its Black Sea fleet (through Bosporus and Dardanelles straits), while Erdogan has been in fact increasing its own naval patrol in the waters near Samsun and Sinop.

The aforementioned 1936 international agreement gives Turkey authority over these waterways, allowing it to regulate naval traffic, especially during wartime. What happened was that Turkey (even while playing a crucial role in brokering the BSGI) actually enforced restrictions on military vessels, effectively blocking Moscow from sending additional warships into the Black Sea, thus impacting its naval operations in the region.

There is a catch in that, namely that Turkey’s recent naval activities are strongly tied to its very enforcement of the Montreux Convention and its growing maritime presence amid Russia’s preoccupation with Ukraine. Since 2022, Turkey has continued flexing its maritime muscle, particularly around the Bosporus and the northern Black Sea coast near its own shores.

On the waters near Sinop and Samsun (two Turkish Black Sea ports), for instance, Ankara has been bolstering naval operations and infrastructure. Sinop was historically a naval hub (during events like the 1853 Battle of Sinop), and recent reports suggest increased deployments there to monitor shipping lanes and assert control over the western Black Sea. Samsun, meanwhile, is a logistical hub supporting Turkey’s coast guard and naval operations. These areas are critical because they lie along the shipping routes Russia relies on for grain exports and military resupply—routes Turkey could influence or even try to disrupt.

Moreover, the Turkish Navy had been planning to establish a new base in the Black Sea town, Trabzon, on the eastern Black Sea coast since 2009 at least. The idea is to create a logistical support base for frigates, submarines, and fast attack craft, and construction reportedly began following announcements in late 2018, with Turkish media cheering the project back then.

Bureaucratic processes seem to have delayed or postponed progress, though there are contradicting reports on that, the project is still ongoing. Be it as it may, the Turkish Navy has 31 warships under construction, while Erdogan’s Turkey is pushing its “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) naval doctrine, which aims to extend Turkish maritime grip over huge areas of the Black Sea, plus the Eastern Mediterranean, and Aegean sea.

It is true that Turkey, albeit a NATO member itself, has historically resisted a larger NATO presence in the Black Sea, as seen in statements from Turkish naval officials. In 2023, for instance, the commander of the Turkish Naval Forces, Admiral Ercüment Tatlıoğlu, reportedly stated that Turkey could secure the Black Sea itself and thus did not want a U.S. or NATO presence there, emphasizing, once again, adherence to the Montreux Convention plus a desire to prevent the Black Sea from becoming a conflict zone like the Middle East.

This could suggest that Ankara’s focus is on maintaining regional control and stability only; other Turkey’s actions, however, such as supporting Ukraine with corvettes and mediating grain deals, indicate a strategy of leveraging its position to further enhance influence and regional stability. Moreover, some analysts have concluded that Turkey is in fact seeking to become the preeminent naval power there. Such ambitions certainly have the potential to destabilize the regional balance of power.

Experts such as Alper Coşkun (who serves as a senior fellow in the Europe Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, located in Washington, DC.) have described Turkey as a “gatekeeper of the Black Sea.” Coşkun argues that Ankara could in fact be emerging as the dominant maritime power in the Black Sea, leveraging its control over the Bosporus Strait and its use of the Montreux Convention to limit military vessel transit.

In late 2024 and early 2025 Turkish naval expansion became more evident, with Ankara tightening its grip on the Black Sea’s western flank. As Russia remains entangled in Ukraine, Erdogan’s discreet military expansion—focused on strategic ports such as Sinop and Samsun—signals an ambition to assert control, seemingly intent on strangling Moscow’s vital sea routes.

To sum it up, by leveraging the Montreux Convention to limit Russia’s Black Sea Fleet while maintaining its own naval presence—evidenced by activities like war games and mine-clearing operations—Turkey is clearly trying to position itself as the dominant maritime power in the region, especially as Russia’s fleet remains entangled in the Ukrainian conflict.

This shift, combined with Turkey’s “neo-Ottoman” aspirations under Erdogan (I’ve written on that before), which emphasize reclaiming historical influence in the Black Sea and beyond, risks escalating tensions with Russia, a historical naval player who has strategic and even existential interests in the region.

Despite Ankara’s balancing and diplomatic endeavors (I’ve commented on how even Turkish “rapprochement” steps in the last years can often be tricky), as Turkey’s actions in fact challenge Russia’s strategic interests, the potential for miscalculation or direct confrontation grows, thus threatening to ignite broader tensions in an already volatile area.

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This article was originally published on InfoBrics.

Uriel Araujo, PhD, is an anthropology researcher with a focus on international and ethnic conflicts. He is a regular contributor to Global Research.

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