FPI / April 11, 2025
By Richard Fisher
President Donald Trump’s first term establishment of the U.S. Space Force in December 2019 was a long-delayed response to China’s creation of a dual-use manned and unmanned military space capability.

But a new Space Force Doctrine Document issued on April 4 now outlines the justification for the U.S. Space Force to build its own combat capabilities in space, though it does not identify or describe the new weapons required by the U.S. Space Force.
China’s military space advances were outlined in April 3 testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission by U.S. Space Force Commander Gen. B. Chance Saltzman, who stated:
“Over the last two decades, our competitors, China in particular, have invested heavily in counter space threats, kinetic and non-kinetic weapons that can deny, degrade, or destroy our satellites…Intelligence suggests the PLA likely sees counterspace operations as a means to deter and counter U.S. military intervention in a regional conflict…By the mid-to-late 2020s, we expect them to deploy systems high enough in power that they can physically damage satellite structures.”
China’s manned dual-use capabilities began in 2003 when its first astronaut flew the Shenzhou-5 mission with two optical surveillance cameras, to its current Tiangong Space Station that has a hanger that can launch interceptor micro satellites or bombs to the Earth, to its plans for military use of the Moon.
The Space Force Doctrine Document offers an important definition of military space power:
“Military spacepower is the ability to accomplish military objectives in, from, and to the space domain. Securing our national interests in space requires safeguarding and enhancing the ability of US commercial, civil, intelligence, and military entities to safely access, maneuver within, and exploit the space domain without prohibitive interference. Military spacepower supports and reinforces deterrence by demonstrating America’s ability and willingness to impose costs and deny an adversary’s benefit from hostile actions.”
It then lists some but not all the activities that would fall under the definition of “space warfare,” including:
• “Deterring or denying attacks on friendly space capabilities by holding adversary space forces at risk.
• Compelling an adversary to cease aggressive action in any domain by disrupting, denying, degrading, or destroying the space capabilities they rely on to achieve their military objectives.
• Undermining an adversary’s strategy and their intent to attrit friendly space capabilities through forcible action in, from, and to the space domain.
• Enabling the application of force in all domains by providing a space-enabled combat edge to terrestrial forces.”
The Space Force Doctrine outlines the goal of “space superiority:
“Space superiority is the degree of control that allows forces to operate at a time and place of their choosing without prohibitive interference from space or counterspace threats, while also denying the same to an adversary.”
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