By Michael Every of Rabobank

What, me worry?

Bloomberg went with a one-word headline in Asia this morning: “Escalation”, which was what I said on Monday while proposing it might be to de-escalate in places. Bloomberg then shifted to “Shambles” to complain ‘Chaos in Rio Shows a World Untethered Even Before Trump Returns’, referring to a G20 meeting with a backdrop of North Koreans fighting in Europe, Israel resisting Middle East US ceasefire attempts, China practicing blockading Taiwan, and nuclear threats now commonplace. Yet going from “All is well (except Trump)” to “PANIC!” lacks nuance. Indeed, while I recently told clients attending our financial market outlook presentations that 2025 was ‘The Year of Living Dangerously’, not everything is worth worrying about equally. Allow a professional worrier to show you how to do it properly!

First, once you see “World War 3!” headlines you might as well go risk on because why not? Ahead of the first Ukrainian ATACMS strike in Russia proper yesterday President Putin had changed his nuclear doctrine so it can use nukes if an attack on its territory is supported by a nuclear power, which it elsewhere stated includes US ATACMS. That saw bond yields fall before reversing. So far, this Russian red line appears to have been crossed without any nuclear fallout. If that all changes, I won’t be writing this Daily, and you won’t be reading it.

Good luck collecting "YES" pic.twitter.com/7pwt34PuOv

— zerohedge (@zerohedge) November 19, 2024

‘Keep Calm and Carry On’ doesn’t apply to lower-level wars, but there’s room for optimism. In the Middle East, Hezbollah is reportedly not yet willing to sign a ceasefire allowing Israel to still defend itself, without which a pause in fighting will be used to rearm – but a deal might yet be struck. There has been a dialling down of rising tensions in the Horn of Africa. Even in Ukraine, everything is about escalating to be in the best position to de-escalate ahead.  

So, if you want to worry, look at less glamorous but arguably more significant headlines that don’t point to world war, per se, but to world disruption, and major world market volatility.

Official allegations of sabotage were made in the EU as: two of Finland’s five nuclear plants had to be shut down; a key Norwegian oilfield was shut by a power outage; the support cable on a Finnish suspension bridge broke; and two key Baltic EU data cables were severed. The Chinese vessel Yi Peng has been flagged as a possible cable culprit and at time of writing was forcibly moored in Denmark. This is likely to prompt a strong Chinese diplomatic response; and perhaps an EU one if it proves a Chinese ship damaged key seafloor infrastructure (again: this also happened to a gas pipeline between Finland and Estonia in October 2023).

Europe is already confronting China in saying its battery producers - and all green tech - can only avoid EU tariffs and set up factories benefiting from subsidies if there is tech transfer. This mirrors Chinese policy back at it, long warned as the only way to avoid deindustrialisation. China might say no, which means one set of problems. Yet even if it says yes, Europe needs huge scale, so huge subsidies, so huge changes to its fiscal rules or banking sector; and huge supplies of inputs like lithium, which “are uneconomic” to develop domestically, and tied up by China internationally. The geopolitical bifurcation of supply chains is still just beginning.  

On bifurcation, Howard Lutnick is going to be US Commerce Secretary. Although this isn’t the Treasury Secretary he’d wanted, Lutnick - as representative of US businesses - has flagged tariffs and ‘Made in the USA’ tax breaks in tandem as a policy he wants to see put in place. Again, we see a mirror of China’s strategy back at it and rapid bifurcation of global supply chains.

On The Search for Spock the US Treasury Secretary, Trump is today speaking to ex-Fed member Warsh and hedge fund manager Rowan, while Senator Haggerty and Trump economic advisor Bessent are still in the mix. For markets thinking there is a chance someone who doesn’t like tariffs might get the top role, think again: why would Trump appoint a pro-tariff Commerce Secretary, who usually opposes such measures by default, only to then select a Treasury head who would not support his trade agenda?  

Moreover, with a Trump ally urging 60% duties on Chinese goods shipped via its new port in Peru, or any port in Latin America, the US is perhaps dipping into its Monroe Doctrine economic statecraft playbook to show what it wants the new world economic geography to look like: it won’t stand for trans-shipment of Chinese goods, so people are going to have to take sides. Relatedly, if China builds a railway across the Andes from Brazil to Peru to allow iron ore and soy access to the Pacific it may trigger the US to build a larger navy to rule the waves. Given China builds far faster than the US, that requires structural changes in its economy and tying ship-building allies like South Korea and Japan into a US bloc; and for national security reasons, Japan will require the US to show a firm hand vis-à-vis Taiwan – a red line for China.

In short, try not to worry about the obvious stuff like “World War 3!” Do worry about whether we are drifting towards a world split in three, geopolitically and economically: the US and allies, China and allies, and would-be ‘neutrals’. Markets might have priced in the leading edge of the Trump Trade, but they haven’t begun to grasp what the above scenario truly looks like.

The Financial Times understands the gravity with its op-ed today explaining ‘Why Trump’s trade war will cause chaos’, and that “tariffs, especially on one country, will lead to an unholy economic and political mess.” It’s right that every Trump cabinet nomination so far shows a determined approach to up-end old ways of doing things, including trade.

That said, the hoary old textbook arguments the FT uses to make its chaos case show it still doesn’t understand international trade. It’s wrong on how comparative advantage works, which Ricardo said assumes no mobile international capital, not free-flowing, free-wheeling capital; on savings vs. investment as the driver of trade when talking about forced-savings mercantilists vs. free traders, not free traders vs. free traders; on assuming the US shifting trade from China to others is a nasty side-effect of a trade war rather than a deliberate aim of one; and on not being able to join the dots from a US no longer able to sustain its global military primacy -on which the plump, pink free-market Financial Times ultimately rests- and the US being forced to run persistent trade deficits by mercantilists which deindustrialise it.

Really: worry that some high-level people still can’t grasp key fundamentals even when they are right in front of them alongside the socio-economic and geopolitical failure of the policies they keep advocating for instead. Worse, this is the same op-ed writer, Martin Wolf, who recently claimed that ‘Market forces are not enough to halt climate change’ and ‘Investor returns imply that the welfare of future human beings is close to irrelevant’; but free trade is obviously sacrosanct. Because reasons.

You can certainly worry that these kinds of prognostications are rapidly going to look like those of holier-than-thou Professor Lichtman of the magical ’13 keys’ that didn’t unlock a Harris victory two weeks ago as expected. As another commentator put it more civilly, “The failure of Allan Lichtman's keys is not merely a personal failure; rather, it reflects the decline of the political expert class in America” as the epistemological foundations upon which these "experts" have sat crumbles away.

At the very least, you can worry that nobody in D.C. is listening to what Wolf is saying.